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Abstract
A collection of formulae, regarded as a set of prerequisite-free normal defaults, generates a
nonmonotonic inference relation through its Reiter skeptical extension. The structure of the initial
set totally determines the behavior of the associated inference relation, and the aim of this paper is
to investigate in two directions the link that exists between a set of defaults and its induced inference
relation. First, we determine the structural conditions corresponding to the important property of
rationality. For this purpose, we introduce the notion of stratification for a set of defaults, and prove
that stratified sets are exactly those that induce a rational inference relation. This result is shown
to have interesting consequences in belief revision theory, as it can be used to define a nontrivial
full meet revision operator for belief bases. Then, we adopt a dynamic point of view and study the
effects, on the induced inference relation, of a change in the set of defaults. In this perspective, the
set of defaults, considered as a knowledge base, together with its induced inference relation is treated
as an expert system. We show how to modify the original set of defaults in order to obtain as output
a rational relation. We propose a revision procedure that enables the user to incorporate a new data
in the knowledge base, and we finally show what changes can be performed on the original set of
defaults in order to take into account a particular conditional that has to retracted from or added to
the primitive induced inference relation. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Nonmonotonic reasoning; Preferential relations; Rationality; Stratification; Conditional revision;
Rationalization; Full meet base revision
Introduction
Any set of formulaeD of a propositional language may be seen as a set of Reiter normal
prerequisite-free defaults [16], or, equivalently, as a Poole system without constraints [14].
As such, it generates an inference relation that corresponds to the Reiter extension of D.
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It was noticed in [13,15] that this induced inference relation is a preferential inference
relation, in the sense of [11], and that it can be represented by a special kind of preferential
model, where the set of states coincides with the set of all worlds attached to the language.
Conversely, we proved in [4] that any consistency-preserving preferential inference relation
defined on a finite language by an injective model is always induced by a set of defaults.
Thus, preferential reasoning, when determined by a preferential injective model, is, in the
finite case, essentially the same as default reasoning: the logic of any agent using injective
preferential reasoning is fully determined by a set of normal prerequisite-free defaults. This
applies in particular to rational reasoning, as it is known that rational inference relations
may always be defined by means of a ranked injective model [3,11].
In this paper, we investigate the link that exists between a set of defaults D and its
induced inference relation |∼D . First, on a statics point of view, we characterize the sets
of defaults for which the induced inference relation satisfies the property of rationality
(postulateK ∗ 8 in belief revision theory). We show that a set satisfies this condition if and
only if it has a stratified structure, analogous to a logical chain of sets. This study turns
out to have interesting applications in the framework of belief revision: as an example,
we show that our results may be used to construct a nontrivial base revision operator that
satisfies the extended set of AGM postulates as well as the categorial matching principle.
This solves a problem posed in [9]. After this statics study, we evoke in the second part of
the paper the dynamics of induced systems, and examine some problems connected with
changes occurring in a given set of defaults: in this perspective, the set D is understood as
representing all the information available to an agent, and the inference relation |∼D that
it induces corresponds to the inferences drawn by the agent. Thus the couple (D, |∼D) is
considered as an expert system. In this perspective, it might be necessary to operate changes
in the knowledge base D for different reasons: first, in order to improve the system, one
may require that the resulting inference process is of a rational type, so that one has to
replace D by a stratified set. Then, it might appear necessary to incorporate in D some
new information. The problem is then to revise D by this information without altering
too much the resulting inference process. A last problem finally is the one that occurs
when one wants to modify the set of defaults D because either it appears necessary to
obtain a particular conditional that was not originally entailed by D, or, on the contrary,
one wishes to remove a conditional that was part of the primitive induced relation. For
all these problems, we shall see that several solutions exist, and we shall compare their
merits.
In order to make the paper self-contained, we have recalled in Section 1 the basic
definitions and properties of preferential inference relations. The notion of induced
inference relation is introduced in Section 2, where we give a simple proof of the
representation theorem of faithfully representable inference relations via their associated
basic set of defaults. In Section 3, we present a characterization of the default sets that
induce rational inference relations and propose an application in the framework of base
revision theory. Section 4 is an introduction to the general study of the dynamics of induced
systems. In Section 5, we discuss the problem of rationalizing an inference relation by a
suitable modification of its set of defaults. In Section 6, we treat the problem of revising a
set of defaults by a new information and the effect of this revision on the induced inference.
Section 7 is concerned with the problem of conditional revision, which occurs when a given
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conditional has to be forced in the agent’s beliefs. We conclude in Section 8. Proofs of the
main results are given in Appendix A.
1. Background
We denote by L set of well-formed formulae over a set of atomic propositions, closed
under the classical propositional connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, → and ↔. When there are only
finitely many atomic propositions, the language is said to be logically finite. Semantics
is provided by the set W of all assignments of truth values to the propositional variables.
Elements of W will be referred to as worlds, and the satisfaction relation between a world
m and a formula α is defined as usual and written m |= α. Thus m |= α ∨ β iff m |= α or
m |= β , and m |= ¬α iff it is not the case that m |= α.
For any world m and any subset A of L, we denote by formA(m) the set of formulae of
A satisfied by m. The set of worlds that satisfy A will be denoted by Mod(A). We write
m |=A iff m satisfies all the elements of A, that is iff A= formA(m).
The classical consequence operation attached to L and W will be denoted by Cn: for
any subset A of L, Cn(A) is the set of all formulae α of L such that m |= α for all worlds
m that satisfy A. Given a subset A of L, we say that A is consistent iff Cn(A) 6= L or,
equivalently, iff there exists a world m satisfying A. The set A is said to be consistent with
the set B iff A ∪ B is a consistent set. We write Cn(A,B) for Cn(A ∪ B), and Cn(α) for
Cn({α}). We use the notation α ` β as an abbreviation for β ∈ Cn(α).
1.1. Preferential inference relations
Following Kraus et al. [11], we call preferential inference relation on L a relation |∼ that
satisfies the following rules:
Reflexivity. α |∼ α.
Left Logical Equivalence. If Cn(α)= Cn(β) and α |∼ γ , then β |∼ γ .
Right Weakening. If β ∈Cn(α) and γ |∼ α, then γ |∼ β .
Cut. If α ∧ β |∼ γ and α |∼ β , then α |∼ γ .
Or. If α |∼ γ and β |∼ γ , then α ∨ β |∼ γ .
Cautious Monotonicity. If α |∼ β and α |∼ γ , then α ∧ β |∼ γ .
Given such a relation, we shall denote by C|∼(α)—or C(α) when there is no
ambiguity—the set of all consequences of a formula α, that is the set of all β’s such that
α |∼ β . We will indifferently refer to “the inference relation |∼” or to “the inference relation
C”. The above rules imply that, for any preferential inference relation C, the sets C(α) are
closed with respect to Cn, that is Cn[C(α)] = C(α) for all formulae α. A formula α is
|∼-consistent, or C-consistent, iff C(α) 6= L. An inference relation C is said to be
consistency-preserving iff C(α) is a consistent set for any consistent formula α. Thus
a preferential inference relation C is consistency-preserving iff C(α) 6= L whenever
Cn(α) 6=L.
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1.2. Preferential models
A preferential structure is a triple M = (S,<, l) where < is an irreflexive and transitive
relation defined on a set S (the set of “states”), and l (the “label function”) is a mapping
from S in the set of worldsW . For any state s, we say that s satisfies the formula α (written
s |= α) iff l(s) does, and we denote by ModS(α) the set of all such states s.
A preferential model, as defined in [11], is a preferential structure (S,<, l) that satisfies
the following condition of smoothness: given any formula α and any state s in ModS(α)
that is not minimal in ModS(α), there exists a state t minimal in ModS(α) such that t < s.
This condition is always satisfied when the preferential structure is finite (i.e., when its set
of states is finite).
A preferential modelM determines a preferential inference relation |∼M by
α |∼M β iff all minimal elements of ModS(α) satisfy β. (def)
The interest of preferential models is that they represent all preferential relations. It was
shown indeed in [11] that, for any preferential inference relation |∼ defined on a languageL
(respectively, a logically finite language L), there exists a preferential model (respectively,
a finite preferential model) M such that |∼= |∼M .
1.3. Injective models and faithfully representable inference relations
We shall call injective a preferential model in which the label function l is injective.
We will be particularly interested in the case where the map l is a bijection. Then, the set
of states can be identified with the set W of all worlds, and the model M is of the form
(W,<), where< is a strict smooth partial order onW . A preferential inference relation that
can be represented by a model of the form (W,<) will be called a faithfully representable
inference relation. Such an inference relation is clearly consistency-preserving. If C is a
faithfully representable inference relation defined on a logically finite language, the model
that represents C is unique, and we will refer to it as the standard model of C (cf. [3]), or
as its Shoham model (cf. [17]).
When the language is logically finite, for any subset T of W we shall denote by χT the
formula equal to the disjunction of all the complete formulae associated with the elements
of T , that is the unique (up to classical equivalence) formula α such that m |= α iff m ∈ T .
We have thus Mod(χT )= T .
In the case of a logically finite language, it will be convenient to identify a world with
the sequence of positive literals that this world satisfies. Thus, in the language built on the
propositional variables p, q, r, s, t , the world prs denotes the world that takes value 1 at
p, r and s, and takes value 0 at q and t . We will denote by ∗ the world that satisfies no
positive literal.
1.4. The basic set of defaults associated with the preferential model (W,<)
Given any strict smooth partial order < on the set W , there exists a set of formulae ∆<
that plays a prominent role in the study of faithfully representable inference relations. This
set will be referred to as the basic set of defaults associated with the model (W,<); it
consists of all the formulae α that satisfy the following condition:
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If α is satisfied by a world n,
then α is satisfied by all worlds m such that m< n. (∗)
Note that the basic set of defaults associated with a preferential model (W,<) is
closed under conjunction and disjunction, and contains the tautologies as well as the
contradictions of the language L. When L is logically finite, we can define the basic set
of defaults associated with a faithfully representable inference relation |∼ as the set ∆<
associated with the unique model (W,<) that represents |∼. In this particular case of a
logically finite language, we will always suppose fixed a representative of each class under
classical equivalence, and choose the elements α of the basic set of defaults among the
representatives of these equivalence classes. Thus in this case, we will view the basic set
of defaults as a finite set consisting of the chosen representatives of the formulae α that
satisfy (∗).
2. Poole systems
The definition and the principal properties of the inference relation associated with a
Poole system can be found in [7,8,13]. We briefly recall some basic facts.
2.1. Definition and main properties of Poole systems
Let D be any subset of L. We may identify this set with a Poole system without
constraints (D,∅) and use this system to determine the conditions that would enable us
to infer a formula β from a premiss α, holding true as much as possible from D. Clearly,
such a formula β should be accepted in the simplest case where it is classically entailed
by the conjunction of α and D, provided that the new information represented by α is
consistent with the basic knowledge base D. In other words, if α is consistent with D,
we consider that β follows from α modulo D if and only if α→ β ∈ Cn(D). This idea
leads to the following definition of the inference relation |∼D induced by the set of defaults
D: β follows nonmonotonically from α modulo D iff α→ β is a classical consequence of
every subset ofD that is consistent with α and is maximal for that property. This definition
amounts to identifying the Poole system (D,∅) with its set of defaults, and to identify a
default formula δ with the prerequisite-free normal Reiter style default: δ/δ. The set of all
formulae β such that α |∼D β is then equal to the intersection of all the Reiter extensions
of (α,D) as defined in [16]. Thus one has
α |∼D β iff β ∈
⋂
Cn(α,Dα),
where the intersection is taken over all the subsets Dα of D that are maximally consistent
with α. Clearly, if the language is logically finite, D may be assumed to be a finite set.
It is known that the inference relation CD =|∼D associated with a Poole system without
constraints (D,∅) is a preferential inference relation (see, for instance, [7]), and it is
immediate from its definition that this inference relation preserves consistency. We will
refer to it as the inference relation induced by the set of defaults D. As noticed by
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Alchourron and Makinson [2], the “limiting case” whereD is a closed theory, that is where
D = Cn(D), gives a trivial output: in this case, one has CD(α)= Cn(α,D) for all formulae
α consistent with D, and CD(α)= Cn(α) for all other formulae [13, Observation 3.3.6].
Example 1 (Defaults and axioms). Suppose that D consists of the single default δ. One
easily sees that the induced inference relation |∼δ is defined by
α |∼δ β iff α ∧ δ ` β when α is consistent with δ, and
α |∼δ β iff α ` δ when α is inconsistent with δ.
Thus in the principal case where α is consistent with δ, the set of formulae that can
be inferred from α modulo δ coincides with the set of classical consequences of α in the
axiomatic theory obtained by adding the axiom δ to the axioms of propositional calculus.
A set of defaultsD ⊆L induces a strict partial order<D on the set of worldsW , which is
defined bym<D n iff formD(n) is a strict subset of formD(m). As observed independently
by Makinson [13] and Poole [15], this order provides a semantic representation of the
preferential relation |∼D induced by D: one shows indeed that the structure (W,<D) is
a preferential model that represents |∼D (see [4] for an alternative proof), so that this
inference relation is faithfully representable. It is worth pointing out that this model is
particularly interesting because it is simple to build and corresponds to the intuitive idea
that a world m is less exceptional, or more normal, than a world n iff it satisfies a larger
subset of formulae in D than n does.
Example 2 (Logical chains). Let D = {δ0, δ1, . . . , δh} be a set of nonequivalent formulae
such that δh = True and, for all indices i, 0 6 i 6 h − 1, δi ` δi+1. Such a set D—or
the corresponding (h + 1)-tuple (δ0, δ1, . . . , δh)—will be called a logical chain. Let us
determine the inference relation induced by D. By definition, for any consistent formula α
and any formula β , we have
α |∼D β iff β ∈
⋂
Cn(α,Dα).
The only subset Dα of D that is maximally consistent with α is the set {δi, δi+1, . . . , δh},
where i is the first index such that α is consistent with δi . It follows that α |∼D β iff
β ∈Cn(α, δi) that is iff α ∧ δi ` β .
By the choice of D, the order of the associated preferential model (W,<D) is given by
m<D n iff there exists an index i such that δi is satisfied bym and not by n. It is interesting
to note that, when D is finite, this relation holds iff m satisfies a strictly greater number of
elements of D than n: in other words, given any finite logical chain D, the order induced
by D is the (ranked) order m<D n iff Card(formD(n)) < Card(formD(m)).
M. Freund / Artificial Intelligence 110 (1999) 103–134 109
2.2. Faithfully representable inference relations and induced relations
We have seen that any induced inference relation is faithfully representable. A partial
converse has been established in [4]; we present here a simple proof in the case of logically
finite languages.
Theorem 3. For any strict partial order < defined on the set W of worlds of a logically
finite language, one has <=<∆, where ∆ is the set of defaults associated with the
preferential model (W,<).
Proof. (a) Suppose first that it is not the case thatm< n. We have to prove that it is not the
case thatm<∆ n. Without loss of generality, one may supposem 6= n. Let Inf(n) be the set
of all worlds p such that p = n or p < n, and δn the formula equal to χInf(n). We claim that
δn is classically to an element of form∆(n), but is equivalent to no element of form∆(m).
Indeed, observe that, up to classical equivalence, one has δn ∈ ∆, since condition (∗) is
clearly satisfied. Moreover, n satisfies δn, and this formula cannot be satisfied by m since,
otherwise, one would have m < n or m = n, contradicting our assumption. This shows
that there exists an element of form∆(n) that is not in form∆(m), so that one cannot have
m<∆ n.
(b) Suppose conversely thatm< n, and let us show thatm<∆ n. It is clear that form∆(n)
is a subset of form∆(m), since for any formula α ∈∆ satisfied by n, one has m |= α by
condition (∗). It remains to prove that this inclusion is strict. But one does not have n <m,
and a construction similar to the preceding one shows the existence of a formula δm that
belongs to form∆(m) and not to form∆(n), whence the result. 2
Note that Theorem 3 establishes two important results in the case of logically finite
languages: the first one states that any strict partial order < on W is of inclusion type:
there exists a set D such that < = <D . The second one is that the basic set of defaults ∆
associated with (W,<) may be taken for such a set D, and therefore provides an explicit
construction for D by means of the condition (∗). Nevertheless, it should be emphasized
that the set ∆ is usually not the simplest of the sets that induce a given order on W . Since
∆ is closed under conjunction and disjunction, it may be suspected that it is usually a “very
large” set, a fact that is confirmed by the following observations:
Observation 4. Any set D of formulae that satisfies <=<D is embedded in ∆.
Proof. Let α be an element of D and n a world that satisfies α. If m is a world such that
m< n, we havem<D n, that is formD(n)⊂ formD(m). We have therefore α ∈ formD(m),
so m |= α. This shows that α satisfies condition (∗) and is therefore an element of ∆. 2
The set ∆ is therefore the largest subset D of L such that < = <D . As we will show
now, it is in fact large enough to “separate the worlds”.
Observation 5. Let < be a strict partial order on the set W of worlds of a logically finite
language, and ∆ its associated basic set of defaults. Then two worlds agree on ∆ iff they
are equal.
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Proof. Suppose that there exists two worldsm 6= n such that form∆(m)= form∆(n). This
equality shows that we do not have m <∆ n. By Theorem 3, this implies that m 6< n. As
we saw in the proof of Theorem 3, there exists then a formula δn ∈ form∆(n) that is not an
element of form∆(m), contradicting our assumption. 2
The property described in the observation above holds for some choices of injective
models of the type (W,<) even in the case of infinite languages, as can be seen in the
following example:
Example 6. Let L be an arbitrary propositional language, δ a consistent formula of L, and
D the set Cn(δ). Let us determine the basic set of defaults ∆ associated with the model
(W,<D). We first note that m<D n iff δ is satisfied by m and not by n: indeed, if m<D n,
one has m 6= n and there exists a formula α ∈D satisfied by n and not by m. The formula
α∨δ is an element ofD and is satisfied by n, hence bym since we havem<D n. It follows
that m |= δ. Conversely, if m |= δ and m |= ¬δ, one has formD(n) ⊂ formD(m) = D,
whence m<D n as desired.
Let ∆ be the basic set of defaults associated with (W,<D). We claim that ∆ is the set of
all formulae that either imply δ, or are implied by δ. Indeed, if α is an element of ∆ such
that δ /∈ Cn(α), there exists a world n such that n |= α ∧¬δ. Let m be an arbitrary world
that satisfies δ. Since δ is satisfied by m and not by n, we have m<D n, and therefore m
satisfies α. This shows that δ ` α, so that the elements of ∆ either imply δ or are implied
by δ. Conversely, any formula γ that implies δ is satisfied only by minimal worlds, and
therefore satisfies condition (∗). Since, by Observation 4, we have D ⊆∆, this shows that
∆ is of the desired form.
Let us show now that∆ separates the worlds: suppose that there exists two worldm 6= n
that agree on ∆, and let β be a formula satisfied by m and not by n. The formula β ∧ δ
of ∆ is not satisfied by n, and is therefore not satisfied by m. The formula ¬β ∨ δ of ∆ is
satisfied by n, hence by m. We have thereforem |= ¬β , contradicting our assumption.
As a direct consequence of Theorem 3, we have the following
Corollary 7. Any faithfully representable inference relation |∼ defined on a logically finite
language is induced by its associated basic set of defaults.
Proof. Denote by (W,<) the standard model of |∼ and by ∆ its associated basic set of
defaults. It follows from Theorem 3 that we have (W,<)= (W,<∆), and the preferential
relations represented by these models are therefore identical. 2
The meaning of Corollary 7 is that, under some mild conditions, preferential reasoning
à la Shoham is the same as reasoning à la Poole. But its interest is also to point out the
existence of a basic set of defaults that comes to conditionalize, implicitly or explicitly,
the inference process of any agent that uses faithfully representable preferential logic on
a finite language, and in particular of any agent that uses consistency-preserving rational
logic, as will be shown in the next section. This result is reminiscent of some well known
theories on human behavior, is as much as they claim that human beings are determined in
their judgments and actions by a set of primary affects.
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The question naturally arises whether Theorem 3 and its corollary have an analogue
in the case of infinite propositional languages. The answer is in general negative (see [4,
Example 8]), and we do not know of any property that would characterize in this case the
inference relations that can be induced by a set of defaults.
We have seen that it is possible to associate with any set of defaults a faithfully
representable preferential inference relation; conversely, by Corollary 7, any such relation
defined on a logically finite language is induced by a set of defaults. In this duality between
default sets and faithfully representable inference relations, it is interesting to determine the
default sets that correspond to the important sub-family of rational inference relations. This
will be done in the next section, where we shall provide a characterization of all default
sets whose induced relation is rational.
3. The analogue of rationality in the Poole–Shoham duality
3.1. The characteristic set of a rational inference relation
We shall turn our attention to a specific family of preferential inference relations that
play a prominent role in the area of nonmonotonic reasoning, namely the preferential
inference relations that satisfy the property of rationality. The aim of this property is to
capture inference process that, whilst defeasible, stand as close as possible to monotonic
consequence relations. Rational inference relations are characterized by the property of
Rational Monotony, that reads, for all formulae α, β and γ :
RM. If α |∼ β and not (α |∼ ¬γ ), then α ∧ γ |∼ β .
An inference relation is said to be rational iff it is preferential and satisfies RM. It is well
known that a preferential relation is rational iff it may be defined by an injective preferential
model (S,<), where S is a subset of W and < is a smooth modular order on S, that is an
order in which the inequality m< n implies for any world p either m< p, or p < n. An
order is modular iff there exists a totally ordered set (T ,<′) and a “ranking” function κ
from (S,<) into (T ,<′) such that m< n iff κ(m) <′ κ(n) (see, for example, [3] or [12]).
A preferential model (S,<) with modular order < is called a ranked model.
When the underlying language is supposed to be finite and the rational relation
consistency-preserving, one may assume that the ranking function, defined on the whole
set W , takes its value in a finite set of integers. The height h of such a rational relation (or
of its standard model) is the number of elements of κ(W). We will always suppose that the
ranking function is normalized, i.e., that κ(W) is the set [0, h− 1] = {0,1, . . . , h− 1}.
Since rational consistency-preserving inference relations are known to be faithfully
representable, they are induced, in the finite case, by their associated basic set of defaults.
In fact, the additional hypothesis of rationality yields a more accurate result: let h be the
height of such a relation |∼, and, for any index i,1 6 i 6 h, denote by ψi the (unique
up to classical equivalence) formula such that Mod(ψi)= κ−1[0, i − 1]. Clearly, one has
ψ1 ` ψ2 ` · · · ` ψh−1 ` True. Let Ψ be the set {ψi | 1 6 i 6 h}. This set, called the
characteristic set of the rational relation, therefore has the structure of a logical chain,
and it turns out that one has |∼= |∼Ψ . Thus any consistency-preserving rational inference
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relation defined on a logically finite language is induced by its characteristic set (see [4]
for details). As we saw in Example 2, relations C induced by such logical chains are easy
to compute: they satisfy C(α) = Cn(α,ψi), where ψi is the first α-consistent element
of the chain, and the order < of their associated ranked model is given by m < n iff
card(formΨ (n) < card(formΨ (m)).
3.2. Stratified sets
It should not be inferred from the above considerations that, when a set of defaults D
induces a rational inference relation, one has necessarily m <D n iff card(formD(n) <
card(formD(m)). For instance, taking for L the language built on the two propositions p
and q , and, for D, the set {p ∧ q,¬q,¬p ∧ q,q}, one easily checks that <D is the empty
relation and is therefore modular. Note that although the world q satisfies two elements of
D while p satisfies only one element, we do not have q <D p.
From now on, we shall assume that the language is logically finite. By what pre-
cedes, any logical chain induces a rational consistency-preserving inference relation,
and any consistency-preserving rational inference relation is induced by a logical chain.
Nevertheless, there exist sets as in the above example that induce a rational inference
relation without having the structure of logical chain. Our purpose is now to characterize
these sets. To do so, we shall have first to look at the structure of the basic set of defaults
associated with a modular order.
Lemma 8. Let |∼ be a consistency-preserving rational inference relation defined on a
logically finite language, Ψ = {ψi | 0 < i 6 h} its characteristic set and ∆ its basic set
of defaults. Then a formula α is an element of ∆ iff either α ` ψ0 or there exists an
index i, 16 i < h, such that ψi ` α `ψi+1 .
Remark. For all indices i such that 16 i < h, let us denote by ∆i the set of all formulae
α 6=ψi+1 such that ψi ` α ` ψi+1. Set∆0 = {α | α `ψ1, α 6=ψ1} and∆h = {True}. Then
the above lemma shows that the sets ∆i form a partition of ∆. Note that one has α ` β for
all formulae α ∈∆i and β ∈∆i+1.
This remark will be used to characterize the sets D that induce a rational inference
relation. We first need to introduce the notion of determinable subsets.
Definition 9. A subset X of a set of formulae Y is said to be determinable in Y iff there
exists a world p such that formY (p)=X.
Equivalently,X is determinable in Y iffX is consistent with the set {¬β | β ∈ Y−X}. As
we shall see, the notion of determinable subsets is fundamental to characterize the defaults
sets that induce rational relations.
Definition 10. A subset D of a logically finite language is said to be stratified iff it is a
disjoint union of sets Di that satisfy the following conditions:
(1) α ` β for all formulae α ∈Di and β ∈Di+1.
(2) Any nonempty proper subset of Di that is determinable in Di is maximally so.
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Given a stratified set D, any sequence (Di) satisfying conditions (1) and (2) of the
definition will be called a stratification of D. A stratified set therefore splits into graded
sheavesDi and the sequence (Di) is analogous to a “logical multichain”: by condition (1),
any element of a sheaf dominates the elements that belong to a sheaf of higher rank. As for
condition (2), note that it is equivalent to the condition
(2′) For all worldsm and n, if ∅ ⊂ form(n)∩Di ⊂ form(m)∩Di , then form(m)∩Di =
Di.
Thus, the trace on Di of two worlds m and n are never comparable, except in the limit
cases. If we denote by<i the order onW induced byDi , we have thusm<i n iff eitherDi
is satisfied by m and not by n, or m satisfies at least an element of Di while n satisfies no
element of this set. Condition (2′) therefore shows that<i is a modular order of height6 3.
Example 11.
(a) The simplest nontrivial example of a stratified set is given by a logical chain
D = {δ0, δ1, . . . , δh} with δi ` δi+1 for all indices i < h. It is indeed immediate
that the subsets Di = {δi} satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of the definition. Another
stratification of D is given by the partition Di = {δi} if i < n − 1 and Dn−1 =
{δn−1, δn}. Thus the stratification of a set, if it exists, is not necessarily unique.
(b) Any set Di of cardinality 6 2 satisfies condition (2) of the definition. It follows that
the set D =D0 ∪D1 ∪D2 is stratified, whereD0 = {p∧ q,q ∧ r}, D1 = {q,p∨ r}
and D2 = {p ∨ q ∨ r}.
(c) Any closed subset D of L is stratified. Let us show indeed that such a set satisfies
condition (2) of the definition. Suppose thatX and Y are two nonempty determinable
subsets of D such that X ⊂ Y . There exists then worlds m and n such that
formD(n) = X and formD(m) = Y . Let β be an element of Y that is not in X.
We have n |= ¬β and m |= β . We claim that Y =D: otherwise, there would exist a
formula α of D such that m |= ¬α. Since D is closed, D would contain the formula
α∨¬β , satisfied by n, and this would imply α∨¬β ∈X, hence α∨¬β ∈ Y , leading
to m |= α ∨¬β , a contradiction.
Since D satisfies condition (2) of the definition, the trivial sequence (D) provides a
stratification of D, and this shows that any closed set is stratified.
Remark. If D is an union of sets D′i that satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 10,
then D is a stratified set: consider indeed the family (Di) defined by D0 =D′0 and, for all
i > 0, Di =D′i −D′i+1. The sets Di then form a partition of D for which condition (1) is
clearly satisfied. To check condition (2), suppose that X = form(n) ∩ Di is a nonempty
determinable subset of Di strictly embedded in a set Y = form(m) ∩ Di . Note that it
follows from condition (1) that, up to classical equivalence, the set D′i ∩ D′i+1 has at
most one element. Let α be this element, if it exists. We have n |= α, for n satisfies at
least an element β of D′i , and we know that β ` α. Similarly, m satisfies α. It follows
that form(n) ∩ D′i = X ⊆ {α}, form(m) ∩ D′i = Y ∪ {α}, and thus that form(n) ∩ D′i ⊂
form(m)∩D′i . By condition (2), we have then form(m)∩D′i =D′i , showing that Y =Di .
We are now ready to establish the main theorem of this section.
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Theorem 12. The inference relation induced by a set D is rational iff D is stratified.
This theorem characterizes the sets D for which the induced inference relation is
rational. As noticed before, such a relation is also induced by its characteristic set Ψ =
{ψi, 1 6 i 6 h}, where ψi is the formula defined by m |= ψi iff κ(m) < i . The link
between the set D and the chain Ψ is now given by the following observation, that shows
how directly determine Ψ without computing the induced ranking κ :
Observation 13. Let D be a stratified set and (D1,D2, . . . ,Dh) be a stratification of D.
For any index i, 16 i 6 h, denote by ηi the conjunction of all elements of Di , and by η′i
the disjunction of all elements of Di . Set ηh+1 = η′h+1 = True. Then the characteristic set
Ψ of the rational inference relation induced by D is the set {ηi, η′i | 16 i 6 h+ 1}.
Example 14. Let us determine the characteristic chains associated with the stratified sets
of Example 11:
(a) If D is a logical chain (δ1, δ2, . . . , δh), we have readily ηi = η′i = δi .
(b) If D is the stratified set D0 ∪D1 ∪D2, with D0 = {p ∧ q,q ∧ r}, D1 = {q,p ∨ r}
and D2 = {p ∨ q ∨ r}, we have
η0 = p ∧ q ∧ r = η′0, η1 = q ′(p ∨ r),
η′1 = p ∨ q ∨ r = η2 = η′2,
and the characteristic chain associated with D is
(p ∧ q ∧ r, q ∧ (p ∨ r),p ∨ q ∨ r,True).
(c) If D is a closed set, there exists a formula δ ∈ D such that D = Cn(δ) (recall we
assumed the language to be finite). The associated characteristic set is then equal to
(δ,True).
Remark. If D is a union of not necessarily disjoint sets D′i that satisfy conditions (1) and
(2) of Definition 10, the elements ηi of the characteristic set associated withD are equal to
the conjunction of the elements of D′i , and the elements η′i are equal to their disjunction,
as follows easily from the preceding remark.
As a straightforward consequence of Observation 13, we can explicitly compute the
rational consequences of a formula α that are induced by a stratified set D:
Observation 15. Let C be the rational inference relation induced by a stratified set D. Let
(Dj )16j<h be a stratification of D, and Dh = {True}. For any consistent formula α, let i
be the first index such that α is consistent withDi . Then one has C(α)=⋂(Cn(α, γ ) | γ ∈
Di−1) if there exists a formula of Di−1 that is consistent with α, and C(α) = Cn(α,Di)
otherwise.
In the perspective of belief revision theory, this result may be analyzed as a general-
ization of Grove’s theory of spheres [10]: when K is a belief set, any revision ∗ of K is
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determined by a system of embedded spheresKi that are closed subsets ofK . For any con-
sistent formula α, the revision K ∗ α of K by α is equal to the expansion Cn(α, Ki) of Ki
by α, where i is the first index such that ¬α /∈Ki . The above observation shows that this
system of embedded spheres may still be used in the general case where the set of beliefs
is not closed under classical consequences: indeed, using the notations of Observation 13,
we note that Cn(Di+1)⊆ Cn(η′i )⊆ Cn(Di), so that, in the light of Observation 15, these
sets may be considered as the analogues of the spheres Ki ’s. The main difference is that
these spheres are no longer subsets of the “set of beliefs” D.
Note, as an interesting consequence of Observation 15, that the sets
⋂
(Cn(α, γ ) | γ ∈
Di−1) and Cn(α,Di) do not depend on any particular stratification of D.
The study made in this subsection provides a satisfactory answer concerning the status
of rationality in the Poole–Shoham duality between default sets and induced inference
relations. It is possible and interesting to extend this study to some families of preferential
inference relations that satisfy properties weaker than rationality, like weak rationality or
disjunctive rationality. In this paper, our study of the statics aspects of induced inferences
will be nevertheless restricted to the only case of plain rationality. Before turning to the
dynamics study of induced inferences, we conclude this section with an application of our
main results in the framework of belief revision theory.
3.3. Full meet base revision
This paragraph may be seen as an illustration of the results that we established in the
study of rational induced relations. As we shall see, Theorem 12 and Observations 13 and
15 have interesting consequences in belief revision theory, leading to the definition and the
study of a full meet base revision operator. The results we obtain in this paragraph have
received an independent treatment in [5], where they have been established by the classical
methods of belief theory.
Given an arbitrary set of formulae B , the full meet revision of B by a formula α is the set
B ∗α =⋂Cn(α,Bα), where the intersection is taken over all maximal α-consistent subsets
Bα of B . In the case of a logically finite language, the revised set B ∗ α is thus equal to
the set of consequences CB(α) inferred from α by the inference relation CB induced from
the set of defaults B . When the set B is closed under classical consequences, the full
meet revision operator ∗ yields a trivial output, as results from the Alchourron–Makinson
triviality theorem: in this case, CB(α) is indeed equal to Cn(B,α) if α is consistent with
B , and to Cn(α) otherwise. If now B is not a closed set, and is therefore a belief base, the
results established in the previous section may be applied to study the properties of this full
meet revision operator. Applying Theorem 12 and the formal correspondence established
in [7] between nonmonotonic logic and the logic of theory change, we immediately get the
following
Observation 16. Let B be a belief base, K its closure and ♦ the revision on K defined by
K♦α =B ∗ α. Then ♦ satisfies the extended set of AGM postulates iff B is stratified.
The result stated in Observation 16 is in fact of little use in belief revision theory:
indeed, it can be applied only when the theory K to be revised is given together with a
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set of “justifications” B . In particular, its iteration is meaningless, since no justification
is provided for the revised theory K♦α. Note that the operator ∗ suffers from the same
shortcoming: the result B ∗ α of the revision of the base B by α is a closed theory, and the
iteration of this revision provides a trivial output by the Alchourron–Makinson triviality
theorem. Furthermore, the use of ∗ as a base revision operator violates the categorial
matching principle, according to which “the representation of a belief state after a belief
change has taken place should be of the same format as the representation of the belief
state before change” [9]. This principle is therefore violated when, starting with a belief
base B , or a theory K with known justification B , one obtains the closed theory B ∗ α in
which the track of any such justification is lost.
It is nevertheless possible to use Theorem 12 together with Observation 15 to define a
full meet base revision operator ♦ that satisfies the principle of categorial matching, and
the closure of which satisfies the extended set of AGM postulates. This operator is defined
as follows:
Let B be a stratified set and (Bj )06j6s a stratification of B . Without loss of generality,
we can suppose that True ∈ B and that Bs = {True}. Let α be a consistent formula, i the
first index such that α is consistent with Bi , and β1, β2, . . . , βn (n > 0) the elements of
Bi−1 that are consistent with α. The full meet base revision of B by α is the set
B♦α = {α ∧ (β1 ∨ β2 ∨ · · · ∨ βn)}
⋃
k>i
(α ∧Bk)∪ {True},
where α ∧Bk denotes the set {α ∧ γ | γ ∈Bk}.
We showed in [5] that this set B♦α does not depend on the choice of the stratification
(Bi), so that the operator ♦ is well-defined (the proof of this result is rather long and
tedious, and we do not incorporate it here, as belief revision is not the subject of this
paper). It is now easy to prove that B♦α is a stratified base, as the sequence B ′0 ={α ∧ (β1 ∨ β2 ∨ · · · ∨ βn)}, B ′1 = α ∧ Bi, B ′2 = α ∧ Bi+1, . . . ,B ′s−i+1 = {α} satisfies
conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 10.
For all consistent formulae α, the full meet base revision operator ♦ therefore associates
a stratified base B♦α with any stratified base B . Using Observation 15, one readily checks
that the full meet revision operator ∗ and the full meet base revision operator ♦ are
connected by the equality Cn(B♦α) = B ∗ α, showing that the closure-extension of ♦
is an AGM revision.
Example 17.
(a) Let B be the logical chain δ0 ` δ1 ` · · · ` δh−1 ` True. For any consistent formula
α, one has B♦α = δi ∧ α ` δ1+1 ∧ α ` · · · ` {α} ` {True}, where i is the first index
such that α is consistent with δi .
(b) If B = {p,q,True}, we can use the stratification B = {p,q} ∪ {True} to compute the
revised base B♦α. In the particular case where α =¬(p ∧ q), we find
B♦¬(p ∧ q)= {¬(p ∧ q)∧ (p ∨ q),¬(p ∧ q),True},
which is equal, up to classical equivalence, to the set
{(p ∧¬q)∨ (¬p ∧ q),¬(p ∧ q),True}.
M. Freund / Artificial Intelligence 110 (1999) 103–134 117
This result conforms with our intuition that revising B by the formula ¬(p ∧ q)
exactly means that one at least of the elements p and q has to be discarded.
We close this section with a list of some elementary properties of the full meet base
operator ♦, to which we shall return in Section 6. A detailed analysis and a discussion
on the meaning of these properties in the framework of belief revision is made in [5]. We
denote by B a stratified base such that True ∈ B , and by α a consistent formula.
FM1. B♦α is a consistent stratified base.
FM2. α ∈ B♦α.
FM3. B♦α = (α ∧B)∪ {True} if α is consistent with B .
FM4. (B♦α)♦α =B♦α.
FM5. B♦(α ∧ β)= β ∧ (B♦α) ∪ {True} if β is consistent with B♦α.
FM6. For all β ∈B, α ∧ β ∈ B♦α or α ∧ β `B♦α.
FM7. If β is consistent with α, B♦α♦β = {β} ∪B♦(α ∧ β).
4. The dynamics of induced systems
So far, the results we have established concern the correspondence between default sets
and inference relations in the Poole–Shoham duality. They can be considered as a study of
the statics of default systems. From now on, we shall adopt a different point of view and
study the effect of a perturbation of a set D on its induced inference relation.
In studying the dynamics of induced systems, it is useful to consider a set of defaults
D ⊆ L as representing a basic information that completely specifies the inference process
of an agent. This process, symbolized by the inference relation |∼D induced by D, enables
the agent to jump from a premiss α to the conclusion β in all cases where α→ β is
classically entailed by the maximal α-consistent subsets of D. The role of the set D,
analyzed as a set of data generating an inference relation, is thus reminiscent of that played
by belief states (or, more precisely, by belief bases) in belief revision theory. Nevertheless
this analogy is purely formal. In revision theory, the agent disposes of a set of beliefsK and
of a revision operator ∗: in the presence of some piece of information α, the agent proceeds
to a revision of her original beliefs, so that α becomes part of the new set of beliefs K ∗ α.
The transformation K→K ∗ α is required to obey some elementary principles, like the
AGM extended set of postulates. In this perspective, a conclusion β will be inferred from
α iff β is a member of the revised set of beliefs K ∗ α. In other words, β is a consequence
of α iff it is not possible to incorporate α in the agent’s belief without incorporating β as
well. In this framework, the subjectivity of the agent is present at two different stages. First,
for the agent, the language L in its whole reduces to a collection of pieces of information
that are evaluated comparatively to the belief baseK: in order to decide whether β follows
from α, the agent has to pretend that the information encoded by α is more reliable than the
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information encoded by K . Next, it should be emphasized that it is the agent that chooses
the revision process ∗ in the context given by the set K and the formula α at hand. Quite
different from this is the framework of induced systems (D, |∼D), where the set D is not
supposed to reflect the current beliefs of the agent but, rather, is meant to encode some basic
information that will be used as a criterion by the agent to build up her beliefs or determine
her behavior. In this perspective, where (D, |∼D) may be considered as an expert system
that enables the agent to draw conclusions modulo D via the inference process |∼D , any
perturbation of the set D has to be studied, first of all, through its effect on the induced
relation |∼D , and the dynamics of induced systems thus fundamentally differs from the
classical theories of belief revision, where additional pieces of information are considered
only through their effect on the set D.
In this paper, we shall not discuss the general problem of the influence, on the induced
inference relation, of arbitrary changes in the original default set; we will only deal with
some elementary dynamical problems. First, we shall discuss the problem of rationalizing
an inference relation, and present some solutions that can be used to transform into a
rational relation the preferential inference relation induced by an arbitrary set of defaults.
Then we will restrict our attention to stratified sets of defaults and introduce a full meet
revision operator analogue to the one introduced in the preceding section. As we shall see,
this operator will prove to be an important tool in the problem of base revision, where one
has to change the original set of defaults in order to take into account a new information. In
the last part of this section, we shall deal with the problem of conditional revision, which
occurs when a set of defaults has to be revised in order to entail a particular conditional
that was not initially part of the induced relation.
5. Rationalizing an inference process
Since rational inference relations play a central role in the field of nonmonotonic
reasoning, it is natural to expect from an agent a rational behavior, i.e., an inference
process in which the rule of rational monotony is satisfied. As we saw, the behavior of
an agent is fully determined by a set of defaults which we will consider as representing
all the available information, and rationalizing the agent’s behavior therefore amounts to
correcting a default set that primitively came to induce an irrational inference process.
We are therefore considering the following situation: starting with a set of defaults
D ⊆ L, we want to transform it into a set Dr so that the induced inference relation
|∼Dr is rational. In looking for a solution of this problem, we have to take into account
some elementary principles that may determine our choice between different possible
rationalizations. Before all, it seems clear that a minimality principle has to be respected
during the rationalization process. This minimal change principle may be differently
interpreted, as one may focus either on the default set itself, or on the induced inference
relation. In the present framework, as noted in the beginning of this section, priority is
given to the induced relation, and changes on the default set can be justified only through
their effect on the induced relation. We shall therefore first take into account the principle:
R-1 Minimal change of inferences. The revised inference relation should differ as little
as possible from the original one.
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For practical reasons, it may also be desirable to keep as much as possible from
the original set of defaults. For instance, a rationalization procedure D → Dr will be
acceptable only if it keeps invariant the sets D that already induce a rational inference
relation, that is the stratified sets. Thus, together with R-1, we might take into consideration
the principle:
R-2 Minimal change of information. The information encoded in the revised set of
defaults should differ as little as possible from the original one.
Another principle can be added to R-1 and R-2, according to which no belief should be
lost in the rationalizing process: by this, we mean that is a conclusion β could be initially
entailed from the premiss α through the set of defaults D, this conclusion should remain
valid when D changes into Dr , so that, in the presence of α, the agent will still believe in
it. This can be put in the following beliefs-preservation principle:
R-3 Conditionals are preserved in the revision process.
Note that in any revision process D→Dr , this condition is fulfilled if and only if the
original induced inference relation |∼D is a sub-relation of the new relation |∼Dr , and that
this amounts to require the inclusion <D⊆<Dr .
Finally, in the particular case of rationalization, one may consider the reliability of the
chosen rationalization operator: by this we mean that if two sets of defaults D and D′
induce the same inference relation (in which case we will say that they are equivalent),
then the rationalized sets Dr and D′r should also induce the same rational relation. This
can be put into a fourth principle:
R-4 Equivalence of default sets is preserved through rationalization.
Principles R-1 to R-4 may be used in defining a set of postulates for rationalization. In
this paper, we shall only present and compare two process of rationalization: the first one
has the feature of being fairly simple and intuitive, while the second one seems to be the
best solution to the rationalization problem with respect to the above principles.
5.1. Chaining the set D
Since the rationalized set Dr is supposed to induce a rational inference relation, this
set must be stratified, and the problem therefore boils down to transform the original set D
into a stratified set. As the simple examples of such sets are provided by logical chains, one
may require the set Dr itself to be a logical chain. In this perspective, the rationalization
problem amounts to construct a suitable logical chain from an arbitrary set D. The most
natural way to build such a chain may be given by the following procedure, evoked in [4]:
For any integer k 6 cardD, denote by γk the formula γk =∨(αi1 ∧ αi2 ∧ · · · ∧ αik ),
where the disjunction is taken over all k-tuples of different elements of D (it may be the
case that gk = False). Set c(D)= {γcardD, γcardD−1, . . . , γ1,True}. This set clearly has the
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structure of a logical chain with 1+ cardD elements, that can be directly computed from
the set D. It thus provides a rationalization of the inference relation induced by D.
Example 18 (Penguins). We compute the chain c(D) in the case where D is the set
{α,β,γ } with α = p→ b, β = b→ f and γ = p→¬f . The order < induced by D
is
We have
γ3 = α ∧ β ∧ γ =¬p ∧ (b→ f ),
γ2 = (α ∧ β)∨ (α ∧ γ )∨ (β ∧ γ )=¬p ∨ b ∨¬f,
γ1 = α ∨ β ∨ γ = True,
and the chain c(D) is therefore equal to (¬p ∨ (b→ f ),¬p ∨ b∨¬f,True). The ranked
model associated with the rational inference relation induced by c(D) is
pf 2
pbf b pb p 1
∗ f bf 0
One easily checks that the induced order <c(D) satisfies m<c(D) n iff m satisfies more
formulae in D than n, that is iff card(formD(n)) < card(formD(m)). This interesting
property holds in the general case:
Observation 19. If <c(D denotes the order induced by c(D) onW , one has for any world
m, m<c(D) n iff card(formD(n)) < card(formD(m)).
The proof is straightforward, observing that a world m satisfies a number k of elements
of D iff it satisfies γk ∧¬γk+1, that is iff formc(D)(m)= {γi | 16 i 6 k}.
The chaining procedure described above provides an easy way to rationalize the
inference relation induced by a set D, by directly reorganizing this set into a logical chain.
As shown by Observation 19, this procedure can be performed even when the original
induced order is not explicitly given, and it only requires the knowledge, for each world,
of the number of elements of D satisfied by this world. Thus the rationalized inference
relation can be directly computed from the value, for each world m, of card(formD(m); in
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this sense, it is, by far, the most natural and the simplest of the rationalization procedures
we know of.
Example 20. Consider, in the propositional language built on the three variables p,q
and r , the set D = {α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, α6} with α1 = (p ∨ r) ∧ ¬q, α2 = ¬p, α3 =
q ∧ ¬r, α4 = ¬ ∨ q ∨ r, α5 = ¬q ∨ (¬p ∧ r) and α6 = ¬r ∧ (p ∨ q). We write the
corresponding Boolean matrix, where the intersection of the ith line and the j th column is
equal to 1 iff the corresponding world satisfies the corresponding formula:
m α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 cardDform(m)
∗ 0 1 0 1 1 0 3
p 1 0 0 0 1 1 3
q 0 1 1 1 0 1 4
r 1 1 0 1 1 0 4
pq 0 0 1 1 0 1 3
pr 1 0 0 1 1 0 3
qr 0 1 0 1 1 0 3
pqr 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Applying Observation 19, we can directly display the ranked model associated with
|∼c(D):
pqr 2
∗ p pq pr qr 1
q r 0
Let us now briefly test this chaining procedure with respect to the principles discussed in
the last paragraph: since the set c(D) is built up fromD by conjunction and disjunction, we
can consider that the principle R-2 of minimal change of information is fairly satisfied. Fur-
thermore, it readily follows from Observation 19 that <D⊆<c(D), so that beliefs are pre-
served through the chaining process, which meets the requirements of principle R-3. Never-
theless, the above chaining procedure does not satisfy the principle R-1 of minimal change
in the induced relation. Computing the order<D induced by D, one gets indeed the model
showing that the minimality of p is lost in the chaining process.
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Even more, this rationalization process suffers from an important shortcoming, as it may
be the case that two sets D and D′ induce the same inference relation, while the rational
relations induced by c(D) and c(D′) differ. This may even occur when D is already a
stratified set:
Example 21. Let L be built on the two propositional variables p and q , and D =
{p∧ q,¬q,¬p∧ q,q}. We have formD(∗)= formd(p)= {¬q}, formD(q)= {q,¬p∧ q}
and formD(pq) = {q,p ∧ q}. It follows that the induced order <D is the empty relation,
so that |∼D is the classical consequence `. Nevertheless, the order induced by c(D) is not
empty: one has indeed q <c(D)∗ .
The failure of R-1 and of R-4 shows that, in spite of its attractive simplicity, the chaining
procedure D → c(D) cannot be considered as an ideal solution to the rationalization
problem. It seems that the best compromise between simplicity and efficiency may be
found in the rational closure process that we present now.
5.2. Rational closure
The construction that Lehmann and Magidor proposed in [12] to extend an arbitrary
set of conditional assertions can be successfully applied to rationalize induced inference
relations, and provides a rationalization operatorD→Dr.c. that meets all the requirements
of principles R-1, R-3 and R-4. This construction is performed in the following way (cf.
Section 5.7 of [12] for details):
Let (W,<) be the standard model associated with a faithfully representable inference
relation |∼. For any world m, define the height of m as the length of a maximal sequence
m1 < m2 < · · · < mk < m. The rational closure of < is then the order <r.c defined by
m <r.c n iff the height of m is strictly less than that of n. The relation <r.c is then a
modular order that extends <. The rational inference relation |∼r.c represented by the
model (W,<r.c) is called the rational closure of |∼. Its induced ranking κr.c satisfies
κr.c(m)= height(m).
Given an arbitrary set of defaults D, we define the rational closure Dr.c of D to be the
logical chain associated with the rational closure of the relation |∼D induced by D. We
have thusDr.c = {δ0, δ1, . . . , δh = True} where, for all indices i, δi is the formula such that
m |= δi iff m is of height less or equal to i .
Example 20 (Continued). Computing the height of each world from the model (W,<D)
of Example 20, we get the following ranked model for the rational closure of <D :
pqr 2
∗ qr pr pq 1
p q r 0
The characteristic associated chain is
Dr.c = {(p ∧¬q ∧¬r)∨ (¬p ∧ q ∧¬r)∨ (¬p ∧¬q ∧ r),¬p ∨¬q ∨¬r,True}.
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It follows from the general properties of rational closure that the rationalization process
it generates fully matches the requirements of the principles R-1 and R-3 of minimal
belief change and belief preservation. As it also satisfies the principle R-4—two equivalent
default sets induce the same order on W , and their rational closures therefore coincide—
this rational closure process provides quite an acceptable solution to the problem of
rationalizing the inference induced by an arbitrary set of defaultsD. It seems, though, that
some improvement could be found in the construction of the rationalized default set Dr.c:
we defined very simply this set to be the logical chain associated with the rational closure of
the original relation |∼D , but any set inducing this relation and “closer” toD would provide
a better solution. In this sense, we shall consider the rationalization problem as completely
solved only once we will be able to find an rationalization operator D→Dr such that Dr
induces the rational closure of |∼D and agrees with D wheneverD is stratified.
6. Base revision
When considering a set of formulae D as the knowledge base of an expert system
that determines the inference process |∼D of an agent, one has to analyze the problem
of adding or retracting an information in a different perspective than in the classical theory
of belief change. Basically, no problem is encountered if one wishes to incorporate in D
a new element α representing a piece of information or a rule that has to be taken into
account: indeed, sinceD may be quite an arbitrary set, generally not closed under classical
consequence and not even consistent, it is enough to replace it by the set D∪ {α} or the set
D−{α}. Nevertheless, we already noted in the last paragraph that first place must be given
to the induced inference relation, and it is through this relation that changes in D have
to be studied and evaluated. Some elementary principles therefore have to be observed in
this perspective, and, before all, that of rationality preservation: if the inference relation
induced by the original set D is rational, so must be the inference relation induced by the
revised setD∗α. Note, however, that violations of this principle are quite conceivable, as it
is always possible to rationalize the relation induced by the revised set through its rational
closure. This could lead to a stronger rational closure preservation principle, requiring the
equality Dr.c ∗ α = (D ∗ α)r.c: the revision by α of the rationalized set Dr.c agrees with
the rationalization of the revised set D ∗ α. In this study, though, we shall only consider
stratified sets, on which we shall apply the full meet base revision operator ♦. This operator
was defined as follows: for any stratified set D with stratification (Dj ) and any consistent
formula α, let i be the first index such that Di is α-consistent, and β1, β2, . . . , βn (n> 0)
the elements of Di−1 that are consistent with α. The full meet base revision of D by α is
the set
D♦α = {α ∧ (β1 ∨ β2 ∨ · · · ∨ βn)}
⋃
k>i
(α ∧Dk)∪ {True}.
In order to incorporate some new data α into a stratified set D, it is quite natural to
consider the set D♦α. The operator ♦ may thus be used in the framework of induced
systems as a tool to revise a set of defaults by a formula α. As ♦ maps stratified sets into
stratified sets, the principle of rationality preservation is satisfied. The explanation and the
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justification of properties FM1–FM7 remain quite relevant to the perspective adopted in
this section, where D is not anymore seen as a belief base but, rather, as a set of items
generating an inference process. It turns out, though, that in the framework of induced
systems, the best results are obtained with the help of a tail added to the operator ♦:
The tailed operator  is defined, for any stratified set D, by Dα = (D♦α) ∪ (α ∨D).
Clearly, if a set Di satisfies condition (2) of Definition 10, so does the set α ∨ Di , so
that Dα is a stratified set. The revision of D by α obtained through the operator  enjoy
properties similar to that of♦. In particular, one has readily Cn(Dα)= Cn(D♦α)=D∗α,
so that  induces an AGM revision. We want to investigate the effect of this revision
operation on the inference relation induced by D.
Let CD be the rational inference relation induced by the stratified set D, and CDα
the rational inference relation induced by the full meet base revision Dα of D by the
consistent formula α. Our aim is to investigate the link existing between these to relations.
To do so, it is convenient to make use of the associated characteristic sets.
Lemma 22. The characteristic set associated with Dα is equal to Ψα, where Ψ is the
characteristic set associated with D.
Proof. We use the notations of Observation 13: if ηi is the conjunction of the elements
of Di , and η′i their disjunction (1 6 i 6 h), setting ηh+1 = η′h+1 = True, we have Ψ ={ηi, η′i | 16 i 6 h+ 1}. Let i be the first index such that α is consistent with Di , and β1,
β2, . . . , βn (n> 0) the α-consistent elements of Di−1. We have then
Dα = {α ∧ (β1 ∨ β2 ∨ · · · ∨ βn)
⋃
k>i
(α ∧Dk)∪ (α ∨D) ∪ {True}.
Note that the formula α∧ (β1 ∨β2∨ · · · ∨βn) is equal modulo classical equivalence to the
formula α ∧ η′i−1. Using the remark made after Example 14, we see that the characteristic
set associated with Dα is{
α ∧ η′i−1, α ∧ ηi,α ∧ η′i , α ∧ ηi+1, . . . , α
}∪ {α ∨ ηj ,α∨′j | 16 j 6 h+ 1}.
This set is precisely equal to Ψα. 2
We can now easily establish the link existing between the relations CD and CDα ,
respectively, induced byD and byDα. By the above lemma, we haveCDα =CΨα . Let
γ be an arbitrary formula. If γ is inconsistent with α, we have CDα(γ )= Cn(γ,α ∨ ηi)
where i is the first index such that ηi is consistent with γ . Thus, in this case, we have
CDα(γ ) = CD(γ ). If now γ is consistent with α, let j be the first index such that
γ is consistent with α ∧ ηj . We have therefore CDα(γ ) = Cn(γ,α ∧ ηj ). But j is
the first index such that the element ηj of Ψ is consistent with α ∧ γ . It follows that
Cn(γ,α∧j )= Cn(α ∧ γ, ηj =CΨ (γ )=CD(γ ). We have therefore proven the
Theorem 23. For all formulae γ , one has CDα(γ )= CD(α ∧ γ ) if γ is consistent with
α, and CDα(γ )=CD(γ ) otherwise.
This result shows that the process of revision by the tailed operator enjoys two properties
that make it well adapted to the framework of induced systems. The first one is that the
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consequences of a premiss γ will remain unchanged after any revision by an information
α that γ contradicts. From the knowledge baseD = {p→ b,b→ f } for instance, an agent
will infer that penguin generally fly (p |∼D f ), and there is no reason why this conclusion
should be invalidated after the agent learns that penguin do not exist (¬p). A second
interesting feature of tailed revision is that, as shown by Theorem 23, the consequences
of a premiss γ are preserved through the revision by α whenever ¬α was not part of these
consequences: indeed, if ¬α /∈ CD(γ ), we have, by rationality, CD(γ )⊆ CD(α ∧ γ ), that
is CD(γ ) ⊆ CDα(γ ). Thus the revision of a stratified default set by the tailed operator
 provides an optimal solution to the problem of minimal change, at the level of the
knowledge base as well as that of the induced inference relation.
We shall now turn our attention to the last problem of the dynamics of default reasoning
and devote the next sections to the study of conditional revision.
7. Conditional change
In the preceding section, the revision of a default setD was considered in the perspective
where a formula α had to be incorporated in the knowledge base D. In this base revision
problem, the attention was focused before all on the set of defaults, and the solutions had
to meet some requirements—the principle of minimal change, or of categorial matching,
for instance—analogous to those that govern the theory of belief change. Quite different
is the problem of conditional revision, that occurs when it appears desirable to force a
change of the agent’s behavior in some specific situation: for instance, we might require
the agent to accept the conditional p ∧ b |∼ f , so that in her beliefs, penguin birds will
normally fly, although such a conditional was not entailed from the initial set of defaults.
Alternatively, we could require that the agent gives up a conditional primitively induced
by a set of defaults. The purpose of conditional revision is therefore to modify, through a
modification of the set D, the inference relation induced by D. This problem splits into
two parts. In the first one, one wishes to perform a conditional contraction in order to
retract a given conditional α |∼ β , and one builds a set D ÷ (α |∼ β) that will not entail
this conditional. In the second one, one wishes to perform a conditional revision: given
a set of defaults D and a conditional α |∼ β that is not induced by D, one tries to build
a set D ∗ (α |∼ β) that will entail the conditional α |∼ β . In both cases, the role played
by the set D is secondary, as is the link between D and the revised sets D ÷ (α |∼ β) or
D ∗ (α |∼ β); our guiding line is the success of the operation: the conditional α |∼ β has
to be entailed by D ∗ (α |∼ β), and should not be entailed by D ÷ (α |∼ β). Apart from
this success postulate, both principles R-1 (minimal change of inferences) and R-3 (belief
preservation) will be determinant when comparing the value of different solutions. Thus,
in the case of conditional contraction, principle R-1 commands that no new conditional
should be added and that a minimal number of conditionals should be discarded, so that
the revised inference relation should be a sub-relation of the original one, maximal among
the sub-relations that do not entail α |∼ β ; similarly, in the case of conditional revision, it
follows from R-1 and R-2 that the revised inference relation should contain the original
one and be minimal among those that entail α |∼ β .
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For simplicity, we will limit our study to rational induced relations. Since the sets of
defaults are taken into account only in as much as they generate an inference relation, we
will always suppose that these sets have the structure of a logical chain. As a matter of
fact, we will see that solutions to the chain conditional revision problem are not easily
applicable to the general case of stratified sets.
7.1. Conditional contraction
By what precedes, the result of a contraction of a rational inference C should be a
rational sub-relation of C. It is therefore important to compare the characteristic chain
of C with that of a sub-relation:
Lemma 24. Let C and C′ be two rational inference relations with associated characteris-
tic sets Ψ and Ψ ′. Then C′ is a sub-relation of C iff Ψ ′ is a subset of Ψ .
Let us now examine the problem of conditional contraction: we suppose given a set
D = {δ0, δ1, . . . , δn = True} such that δi ` δi+1 for all indices i < n, and a conditional
α |∼ β induced byD. We have thus β ∈ C(α), where C the rational relation induced byD.
Our aim is to build a set D′ that has the structure of a logical chain (δ′0, δ′1, . . . ,True) with
induced relation C′ that satisfies C′ ⊆ C and β /∈ C′(α). Clearly, this problem admits no
solution in the case where α ` β , and we shall therefore suppose that β is not a classical
consequence of α. By Lemma 24, we can see that this problem amounts to choose a subset
D′ of D for which α |∼D′ β does not hold. Such subsets D′ are easy to determine:
Observation 25. Let D′ = (δ′k) be a sub-chain of D = (δl), and α |∼ β a conditional
entailed by D and not entailed by D′. If i is the first index such that δi is consistent with α
and j the first index such that δj is consistent with α ∧¬β , one has j > i and δ′k 6= δs for
all indices k and s such that i − 1< s < j .
This result states that, in order not to entail the conditional α |∼ β primitively entailed
by D, it is necessary to retract from D at least the sub-chain δi ` δi+1 ` · · · ` δj−1.
Proof. Let < be the modular order induced on W by D. Since we have α |∼D β , any
<-minimal world that satisfies α must satisfy β . By the choice of i , the minimal worlds that
satisfy α have rank i , and any world of rank i therefore satisfies ¬α ∨ β . This shows that
δi ` ¬α ∨ β , hence that i < j . Suppose now that there exists elements δ′k of D′ such that
δ′k ∈ {δi, δi+1, . . . , δj−1}, and let r be the first index such that δ′r = δs ∈ {δi, δi+1, . . . , δj−1}.
By the choice of i, r =Min(t | δ′t is consistent with α), so that the <′-minimal worlds that
satisfy α satisfy δ′r . Since, by the choice of j , δ′r is inconsistent with α∧¬β , such minimal
worlds satisfy β . This leads to α |∼D′ β , contradicting our hypothesis. 2
By what precedes, any solution to the conditional contraction problem necessarily
boils down to choose a “best” element among the family of the subsets D′ of D −
{δi, δi+1, . . . , δj−1}. It turns out that the maximum element of this family, the whole set
D − {δi, δi+1, . . . , δj−1}, does the job (as do, in fact, all the elements of this family):
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indeed, the chain associated with the set D′ = D − {δi, δi+1, . . . , δj−1} is the chain
δ0 ` δ1 ` · · · ` δi−1 ` δj ` δj+1 ` · · · ` True. The first element of this chain that is
consistent with α is the element δj , which is consistent with α ∧ β . It follows that there
exists a world m, <′-minimal among those that satisfy α, such that m satisfies ¬β . This is
equivalent to say that one does not have α |∼D′ β .
We can now summarize our results, observing that by the definition of i and j , we have
i = j iff C does not entail α |∼ β .
Theorem 26. Let C be a rational inference relation, and α and β two formulae such that
β /∈Cn(α). Then there exists a greatest rational sub-relation C′ of C such that β /∈ C′(α).
If C is induced by the logical chain δ0 ` δ1 ` · · · ` True,C′ is induced by the sub-chain
δ0 ` δ1 ` · · · ` δi−1 ` δj ` δj+1 ` · · ·True, where i is the first index such that δi is
consistent with α, and j is the first index such that δj is consistent with α ∧¬β .
If D is the set {δ0, δ1, . . . ,True}, the characteristic chain of the relation C′ will be
referred to as the contraction ofD by the conditional α |∼ β , and denoted byD÷ (α |∼ β).
Note that D =D÷ (α |∼ β) iff D does not entail α |∼ β .
Example 18 (Continued). We have seen that the chain D = {δ0, δ1, δ2} with δ0 = ¬p ∧
(b→ f ), δ1 =¬p ∨ b∨¬f and δ2 = True induced the following ranking
pf 2
pbf b pb p 1
∗ f bf 0
Note that D entails the conditional p ∧ f |∼ b, so that, for any agent using the expert
system (D, |∼D), penguins that fly are normally birds. Let us determine the contraction
D ÷ (p ∧ f |∼ b) of D by p ∧ f |∼ b: with the above notation, we have i = 1 and j = 2.
The result of this contraction is therefore the set D÷ (p ∧ f |∼ b)= {δ0, δ2}, inducing the
ranked model
pf pbf b pb p 1
∗ f bf 0
It is possible to directly display the ranking associated with the revised default set
D′ =D ÷ (α |∼ β), without computing explicitly the elements of this chain: note indeed
that we have i =Min(κ(m) | m |= α) and j =Min(κ(m) | m |= α ∧ ¬β) where κ is the
ranking associated with D. If κ ′ is the ranking associated with D′, we have κ ′(m) =
Min(k /∈ {i, i + 1, . . . , j − 1} |m |= δk). The ranked model associated with D′ is therefore
obtained from the original model by putting at the same κ ′-rank all the worlds m such that
i 6 κ(m) < j . In the above example, for instance, worlds of rank 1 and of rank 2 move at
the same level.
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7.2. Conditional revision
In this section, we consider the problem of conditional revision, dual to the one of
conditional contraction: given a conditional α |∼ β that is not entailed by a logical chainD,
we want to perform changes on D in order to get a chain D′ that entails α |∼ β . Consider
for instance the set D of the preceding example. The ranked model associated with D was
pf 2
pbf b pb p 1
∗ f bf 0
which did not entail p ∧ b |∼ f since the world pb, minimal in Mof(p ∧ b), does not
satisfy f . If it appears desirable that, in the agent’s beliefs, penguin-birds fly, one has to
modify the knowledge base D into a set D′ that yields the conditional p ∧ b |∼ b.
Let C and C′ be the rational relations induced by D and the set D′ we are looking for.
By hypothesis, we have β /∈ C(α), and C′ has the property that β ∈ C′(α). In view of the
belief preservation principle, C must be a sub-relation of C′. Nevertheless, this will be
impossible if ¬β ∈ C(α), since, in this case, C′ would not be consistency-preserving. It
will be therefore necessary to first perform a conditional contraction, in order to retract the
conditional α |∼ ¬β from C.
We suppose this has been done, so that, possibly after a contraction, the set D does
not entail the conditional α |∼ ¬β . It is then possible to consider the family of rational
extensions of C that entail α |∼ β , and to choose for C′ a minimal element of this
family. By Lemma 24 indeed, this amounts to build a minimal chain D′ = (δ′i) extending
D = (δj ), with β ∈ Cn(α, δ′j ), where j is the first index such that α is consistent with
δ′i . The procedure we propose is the following one: denote by i the first index such that
α is consistent with δi . We simply define the conditional revision D ∗ (α |∼ β) of D by
(α |∼ β) to be the setD′ = (δ0, δ1, . . . , δi−1, δi−1∨ (δi ∧ (¬α∨β), δi , δi+1, . . . ,True) that
is obtained from D by adding the single formula δ′ = δi−1 ∨ (δi ∧ (¬α ∨ β). Observe that
the hypothesis ¬β /∈ C(α) = Cn(α, δi) implies that δ′ is the first element of the chain D′
that is consistent with α. Since we have readily β ∈ Cn(α, δ′), we see that, as desired, the
conditional α |∼ β is entailed by the revised set D′. Note that the sets D and D′ coincide
iff β ∈ Cn(α, δi) that is iff D already entailed the conditional α |∼ β .
It is easy to describe the semantics of the rational relation induced by the set D′ defined
as above: the revised ranking κ ′ is given by κ ′(m) = κ(m) if κ(m)6 i − 1, κ ′(m)= i if
κ(m)= i andm |= ¬α∨β , and κ ′(m)= κ(m)+ 1 otherwise. Thus, a new rank has simply
been added between the original ranks i and i + 1, which consists of all worlds m that
satisfy ¬β and had minimal κ-rank in mod(α).
Example 18 (Continued). Consider the chain D = {δ0, δ1, δ2} of Example 18, with δ0 =
¬p ∧ (b→ f ), δ1 =¬p ∨ b∨¬f and δ2 = True, inducing the ranking
M. Freund / Artificial Intelligence 110 (1999) 103–134 129
pf 2
pbf b pb p 1
∗ f bf 0
To perform the revision of D by p ∧ b |∼ f , we determine the first index i such that δi
is consistent with p ∧ b. We find i = 1. The revised chain is therefore
D′ =D ∗ (p ∧ b |∼ f )
= (¬p ∧ (b→ f ),¬p ∧ (b→ f )∨ [(¬p ∨¬b∨¬f )∧ (¬p ∨¬b∨ f )],
¬p ∨ b∨ f,True),
that is
D′ = (¬p ∧ (¬b∨ f ),¬p ∨ [(b∨¬f )∧ (¬b∨ f )],¬p ∨ b∨ f,True).
The induced κ ′ ranking is
pf 3
pb 2
p b pbf 1
∗ f bf 0
The world pb, that satisfies ¬f , had κ-rank 1 and was minimal in mod(p ∧ b). In the new
ranking, it is given rank 2. The conditional p ∧ b |∼ f is now entailed by D′.
It is clear that there exists several minimal solutions to the conditional revision problem.
Instead of adding to D the formula δ′ = δi−1 ∨ (δi ∧ (¬α ∨ β), we could have considered
for instance the set D′′ =D ∪ {δi−1 ∨ (δi ∧ β)}, that also entails the conditional α |∼ β .
The choice of δ′ is nevertheless imposed by the principle R-2 of minimal change in
the default set: one shows indeed easily that if δ′′ is a formula such that the chain
(δ0, . . . , δi−1, δ′′, δ1, δi+1, . . . ,True) induces the conditional α |∼ β , then δ′′ ` δ′. In this
sense, the solution we presented here may be considered as the best solution to conditional
revision.
So far, we supposed that the initial set of defaults D did not entail the conditional
α |∼ ¬β , and mentioned that it was always possible to retract this conditional if this
condition was not satisfied. By this, we mean that we define the revision of D by (α |∼ β)
as the set (D ÷ (α |∼ ¬β)) ∗ (α |∼ β). Using the results of the preceding section, we
haveD÷ (α |∼ ¬β)= (δ0, δ1, . . . , δi−1, δj , δj+1, . . . ,True), where i is the first index such
that δi is consistent with α, and j the first index such that δj is consistent with α ∧ β .
Note that δj becomes the first element of the contracted chain D ÷ (α |∼ ¬β) that is
consistent with α. Recall that, as observed before, we have D = D ÷ (α |∼ ¬β) iff D
does not entail α |∼ ¬β . We finally proceed to the revision of D ÷ (α |∼ ¬β) by α |∼ β
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as described above, and get the chain D ∗ (α |∼ β) equal to (δ0, δ1, . . . , δi−1, δi−1 ∨ (δj ∧
(¬α ∨ β)), δj , δj+1, . . . ,True). This proves the
Theorem 27. Given two formulae α and β such that β is consistent with α, there exists
a unique conditional revision process that fully satisfies the principles R-1, R-2 and R-
3 and transforms a logical chain D into a logical chain D ∗ (α |∼ β) inducing the
conditional α |∼ β . If i is the first index such that δi is consistent with α, and j the
first index such that δj is consistent with α ∧ β , the chain D ∗ (α |∼ β) is equal to
(δ0, δ1, δi−1, δi−1 ∨ (δj ∧ (¬α ∨ β)), δj , δj+1, . . . ,True).
The semantics induced by D ∗ (α |∼ β) is easily described, using first the semantics of
conditional contractions.
Example 28. Consider, in the language built on the three variables p,q, r , the chain
D = (δ0, δ1, δ2,True), where δ0 = p ∧ q ∧ r, δ1 = q ∧ (p ∨ r), δ2 = p ∨ q ∨ r . The
associated ranked model is
∗ 3
p q pr r 2
pq qr 1
pqr 0
We want to revise D by the conditional ¬p ∧ r |∼ ¬q . With the above notations, we find
i = 1 and j = 2. The revised chain D ∗ (¬p ∧ r |∼ ¬q) is therefore equal
(p ∧ q ∧ r, (p ∧ q ∧ r)∨ ((p ∨ q ∨ r)∧ (p ∨¬r ∨¬q), (p ∨ q ∨ r),True).
We thus have
D ∗ (¬p ∧ r |∼ ¬q)= (p ∧ q ∧ r,p ∨ (q ∧¬)∨ (¬q ∧ r),p ∨ q ∨ r),True).
To find the associated model, we first display the model of D ÷ (¬p ∧ r |∼ q), which is
obtained by putting at the same rank worlds that had rank 1 and 2:
∗ 2
p q pr r pq qr 1
pqr 0
We then note that there exits one world that minimally satisfies ¬p ∧ r , and satisfies q ,
which is the world qr. This world is then given a new rank 2, and the model associated
with D ∗ (¬p ∧ r |∼ ¬q) is therefore equal to
∗ 3
qr 2
p q pr r pq 1
pqr 0
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8. Conclusion and further work
In studying the relations between a set of formulae and its induced inference relation,
we were able to establish interesting results in several important domains that either have
to do with the statics of induced systems (e.g., our characterization of the analogue of
rationality in the Poole–Shoham duality), or concern problems linked to the dynamics of
these systems, like those of rationalization or of conditional revision. The solutions that
we proposed are effective and adequate, but it is clear that some improvements have to be
found in several points. Let us mention two of them: first, the problem of rationalization
through rational closure cannot be considered as settled, since it is far from satisfying the
principle of base-minimal change. An ideal solution would provide, from an arbitrary set
D, a stratified set Dr that 1) would induce the rational closure of the inference relation
induced by D, and 2) would minimally differ from D. In the solution we presented,
the rationalized set was taken to be a logical chain, which, in fact, had little to do with
the original set D. The second improvement that can be searched in the dynamics of
induced systems is the possibility to extend to arbitrary stratified sets the constructions
of conditional contractions and revisions that were made in Section 7 for logical chains.
It would be interesting to know if, in the general framework of stratified sets, a unique
solution could still be proposed for this revision problem.
It should be finally emphasized that the present work only dealt with logically finite
languages: in an arbitrary propositional language, it is possible to apply these results when
dealing with finite sets of defaults by considering an adequate finite sub-language, but, in
the general case, nothing is known about the relationship between the structure of a set of
defaults and that of its induced inference relation. Among the open problems in this area
remains that, evoked in a preceding paper, of characterizing all the defaults sets that induce
a rational inference relation.
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Appendix A. Proofs of lemmas and theorems
Lemma 8. Let |∼ be a consistency-preserving rational inference relation defined on a
logically finite language, Ψ = {ψi | 0 < i 6 h} its characteristic set and ∆ its basic set
of defaults. Then a formula α is an element of ∆ iff α ` ψ0 or there exists an index
i, 16 i < h, such that ψi ` α ` ψi+1.
Proof. Suppose first that a formula α satisfies the property stated in the lemma and let
us prove that α ∈ ∆, i.e., that property (∗) holds for α. Clearly we can suppose that α
is consistent. Note that it follows from the definition of ψi that a world p satisfies ψi
iff κ(p) < i , where κ is the ranking function associated with |∼. Let n be a world that
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satisfies α. If α `ψ1, we have n |=ψ1, n is of rank 0, hence n is minimal and the condition
(∗) is trivially satisfied. If α is such that ψi ` α m ψi+1, n is of rank κ(n) 6 i . For any
world m < n, we have κ(m) < i , showing that m satisfies ψi , hence m |= α. This shows
that α satisfies condition (∗) and is therefore an element of ∆.
Conversely, let α be an element of ∆. If α is a contradiction, we have trivially α ` ψ1.
If α is consistent, let i be rank of a world n of maximal rank that satisfies α. Any world
m satisfying α has therefore a rank κ(m) 6 i , and therefore satisfies ψi+1. This shows
that α ` ψi+1. If now a world p satisfies ψi , we have κ(p) < i = κ(n), that is p < n. By
condition (∗), we have p |= α, and this shows that ψi ` α, completing the proof of the
lemma. 2
Theorem 12. The inference relation induced by a set D is rational iff D is stratified.
Proof. Suppose first that the inference relation induced by D is rational, and let us prove
that D is a stratified set. Denote by Ψ = {ψ1,ψ2, . . . ,ψh} the characteristic set of the
induced inference relation and by ∆ its basic set of defaults. For each index i, 0< i < h,
let ∆i be the subset of ∆ consisting of all formulae α ∈ ∆ such that α 6= ψi+1 and
ψi ` α ` ψi+1. Set ∆0 = {α ∈∆ | α ` ψ1 and α 6= ψi} and ∆h = {True}. We know from
Observation 4 that D ⊆∆. For each index i , let Di be the set D ∩∆i (it may be the case
that Di = ∅). The set D is then a disjoint union of the sets Di ’s, and condition (1) of
Definition 10 is clearly satisfied. To check condition (2), suppose first that i > 0, and let
X be a nonempty strict subset of Di determinable in Di . There exists a world n such that
form(n) ∩ Di = X. Since n satisfies elements of ∆i , we have κ(n) 6 i , where κ is the
ranking function associated with the rational relation induced by D. Note that, X being
a strict subset of Di , we do not have n |= Di , so that n does not satisfy ψi . This shows
that ψ(n) = i , and it follows from condition (1) that formD(n) = X⋃j>i Dj . If X were
not a maximal strict determinable subset of Di , there would exist a strict subset Y of Di
with X ⊂ Y , and a world m such that form(m) ∩Di = Y . As noticed above, this would
imply κ(m)= i and formD(m)= Y⋃j>i Dj . We would then have m <D n, contradicting
the fact that m and n have same rank i . This shows that condition (2) of the definition is
satisfied for i > 0. If now X is a strict nonempty determinable subset of D0, and n a world
such that form(n) ∩D0 =X, we see that n has rank 0 and is therefore <D-minimal. One
concludes, that X is maximal among the determinable strict subsets of D0.
Conversely, let us prove now that the inference relation induced by a stratified set D
is rational. To do so, we shall show that <D is a modular order. We denote by (Di) a
stratification of D.
Let n,m and p be elements of W such that m<D n and not m<D p. We have to check
that p <D n. Suppose first that formD(n) = ∅. Since we do not have m <D p, the set
formD(p) is not empty, and it follows that p <D n as desired. We are therefore left with
the case where formD(n) is not empty. Let j be the first index such that form(n)∩Dj 6= ∅.
By condition (1) of Definition 10, we have readily form(n)∩D = form(n)∩Dj ⋃k>j Dk .
This set is a strict subset of formD(m), as results from the inequalitym<D n. By condition
(1) again, we have then form(n) ∩DJ ⊂ form(m) ∩Dj . Applying now condition (2), we
see that form(m) ∩ Dj = Dj , showing that m |= Dj . Since we do not have m <D p,
we have either formD(m) = formD(p), in which case we get p <D n as desired, or
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formD(p)* formD(m). In the latter case, there exists an element α ofD that is satisfied by
p and not by m. Clearly, α /∈⋃k>j Dk and, by condition (1), α `Dk for all k > j . Since
p |= α, we have then {α}⋃k>j Dk ⊆ formD(p). As m does not satisfy α, and m<D n, n
does not satisfy α either, and formD(n) is therefore a strict subset of {α}⋃k>j Dk . This
leads to formD(n)⊂ formD(p), showing that p <D n as desired. 2
Observation 13. Let D be a stratified set and (D1,D2, . . . ,Dh) be a stratification of D.
For any index i, 16 i 6 h, denote by ηi the conjunction of all elements of Di , and by η′i
the disjunction of all elements of Di . Set ηh+1 = η′h+1 = True. Then the characteristic set
Ψ of the rational inference relation induced by D is equal the set {ηi, η′i | 16 i 6 h+ 1}.
Proof. Let Ψ ′ be the set {ηi, η′i | 1 6 i 6 h}. Clearly, Ψ ′ has the structure of a logical
chain. To show equality (modulo classical equivalence) between the two logical chains Ψ
and Ψ ′, it is enough to show that they induce the same inference relation, and this amounts
to show that check that the induced orders<Ψ and<Ψ ′ are equal. Since we have<Ψ=<D ,
we have therefore to prove that the orders<D and <Ψ ′ coincide, that is that the inequality
m<D n holds iff there exists a formula in Ψ ′ that is satisfied by m and not by n.
Suppose first that m <D n. Then there exists a formula α ∈ D that is satisfied by m
and not by n. Let i be the first index such that α ∈ Di . If m satisfies the whole set Di ,
we see that the formula ηi ∈ Ψ ′ is satisfied by m and not by n. If now form(m) ∩Di is a
strict subset of Di , it follows from condition (2) together with the inequality m<D n that
form(n)∩Di = ∅, and thus that the element η′i of Ψ ′ is satisfied by m and not by n.
Suppose now that there exists an element of Ψ ′ that is satisfied by m and not by n. This
element is of the form ηi or η′i . In the first case, m satisfies the whole set Di , which is not
satisfied by n. Condition (1) then implies that formD(m) ⊇⋃j>i Dj while formD(n) ⊂⋃
j>i Dj . It follows that m <D n. In the second case, we have form(m) ∩ Di 6= ∅,
form(n)∩Di = ∅, and we conclude similarly that m<D n. 2
Lemma 24. Let C and C′ be two rational inference relations with associated characteris-
tic sets Ψ and Ψ ′. Then C′ is a sub-relation of C iff Ψ ′ is a subset of Ψ .
Proof. It is immediate that C′ ⊆ C whenever Ψ ′ ⊆ Ψ . Conversely, suppose that C′ is
a sub-relation of C. Denote by κ and Ψ ′ the associated rankings and by < and <′ the
associated modular orders. Note that <′ is a sub-relation of <. Let (ψ ′0,ψ ′1, . . . ,True)
and (ψ0,ψ1, . . . ,True) be the characteristic chains associated with C′ and C. Since any
<-minimal world is <′-minimal, we have ψ0 ` ψ ′0. Let ψ ′i be any element of Ψ ′, and j
the first index such that ψ ′i ` ψj . We claim that these formulae are equal modulo classical
equivalence, that is that ψj ` ψ ′i . If j = 0, this results from the fact that ψ0 ` ψ ′0 ` ψ ′i . If
j > 0, there exists a world p that satisfies ψ ′i ∧¬ψj−1. This world has κ-rank κ(p)= j .
Note that, for any world m, κ ′(m) > i implies κ(m) > j : indeed, if κ ′(m) > i , we have
p <′ m, hence p <m, yielding κ(m) > j . If now a world q satisfies ψj , we have, by what
precedes, κ ′(q)6 i , so that q satisfies ψ‘i . This shows that ψj ` ψ ′i and the proof of the
lemma is complete. 2
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